Hide seek and negotiate: Alfred Cope and counter intelligence in Ireland 1919–1921 by Sloan, Geoffrey
Hide seek and negotiate: Alfred Cope and  
counter intelligence in Ireland 1919–1921 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Sloan, G. (2017) Hide seek and negotiate: Alfred Cope and 
counter intelligence in Ireland 1919–1921. Intelligence and 
National Security, 33 (2). pp. 176-195. ISSN 1743-9019 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1329118 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/67484/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1329118 
Publisher: Taylor & Francis 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1 
HIDE SEEK AND NEGOTIATE: ALFRED COPE AND  COUNTER 
INTELLIGENCE IN IRELAND 1919-1921    
 
 
      The negotiations which he (Cope ) undertook at considerable danger 
to himself were approved by his superiors and he was able to bring about 
a state of affairs whereby the treaty of 1921 could be signed.1    
 
I do not know if anything can be done to restrain persons like Mr Cope 
from preaching rebel doctrines in this Brigade Area. The area 
administered by the Essex Regiment is a bad one, and the rebels were 
only kept from over-running the whole area by the good military spirit 
shown by this regiment.2  
 
Perhaps it is true of Andy (Alfred Cope) as it is of most of those who have 
had to make their own way to make, and have made it, that he clings to 
power won against the odds more jealously then men to whom power has 




These three epigraphs illustrate both the personality and the actions of the 
Englishman Alfred ‘Andy’ Cope who, between 1920 and 1922, held the 
post of Assistant under Secretary in Dublin Castle, with specific 
responsibility for police administration and efficiency,then the centre of 
British administration in Ireland. This was a period when the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was engaged in fighting an 
insurgency inside its borders. Foot has chronicled his career before his 
posting to Ireland4. He has also suggested the nature of Cope’s  activities 
with respect to the leaders of  this insurgency: “After several false starts, 
he secured the confidence of the principle Irish revolutionary leaders, 
Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith and Eamon de Valera, in his own good 
faith, while remaining perfectly loyal to the crown…and he played a 
major part in securing the truce of 11 July 1921”5. Foot also revealed on 
                                                 
1 The Times 14th May 1954.  
2 Memo by Colonel Commandant 17th Infantry Brigade to Headquarters 6th Division, Ireland ,15th 
September 1921.Strickland Papers ,Imperial War Museum  P363.  
3 The Last Days of Dublin Castle ,The Diaries of Mark Sturgis,(ed M. Hopkinson) Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press 1999 ,p42.   
4 Alfred William Cope was born in 1877 and entered government service as a boy clerk. He joined the 
detective  branch of  the department of customs and excise in 1896 ;and was made a preventative 
inspector in 1908.His energy and intelligence soon made him head of the branch in London and he 
spent ten adventurous  years pursuing smugglers and illicit distillers, especially in the docklands.” M. 
R. D. Foot, Dictionary of National Biography  1951-1960 ,Oxford :Oxford University Press,1971 p251.          
5 Ibid  p 252. 
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whose authority he was acting:  “Ostensibly his task was to preserve civil 
order through the Royal Irish Constabulary; in fact he had already been 
charged by Lloyd George with the task of sounding out Sinn Fein opinion 
about the possibilities of a truce in the Anglo-Irish war”.6 Hopkinson has 
endorsed this judgement: “He became, probably at Lloyd George’s wish, 
the main British contact with Sinn Fein and the IRA and set up a host of 
peace initiatives, nervy and highly strung by temperament, Cope was 
intensely hard working but seemed unable to delegate”.7 His activities 
during this period are critical to understand as they go far to explain the 
outcome of the insurgency. However, this is hampered by two things: 
“The secretive character of Cope’s work and the absence of personal 
papers make him a tantalisingly enigmatic figure”.8 Most of the existing 
literature, with the exception of the diaries of Mark Sturgis, which 
contain both oblique and candid references to Cope’s activities,9 support 
a teleological narrative that he was carrying out a policy formulated by 
Lloyd George and enacted by a small group of civil servants in Dublin 
Castle. 
 
This article will address the unquestioned impediments indicated by 
Hopkinson in a two-fold manner. First, by framing the empirical evidence 
of his  activities, between June 1920 and the October 1922 with a 
counter-intelligence analysis. Dulles defined counter-intelligence in the 
following manner: “Counter-espionage is inherently a protective and 
defensive operation. Its primary purpose is to thwart espionage against 
one’s country, but it may also be extremely useful in uncovering hostile 
penetration and subversive plots.”10 The perennial concepts or variables 
of counter-intelligence are to ‘locate, identify and neutralize’. Zuehlke 
developed a more nuanced approach when he argued that there was an 
essential corollary to any counter- intelligence activity. He described it as 
’counter-intelligence information’11 His point was that these three 
variables oversimplify a complex reality. He cited Sherman Kent because 
he : “shows  an awareness of this vital feature by mentioning ’the 
knowledge and the activity’ that must precede action taken against the 
                                                 
6 Ibid p252. 
7 The Last Days of Dublin Castle ,The Diaries of Mark Sturgis (ed M. Hopkinson) Dublin :Irish 
Academic Press ,1998 p5-6.   
8 Ibid p6. 
9 Mark Sturgis was a British civil servant from the Treasury who was appointed joint  Assistant 
Secretary along with Cope in May 1920.Interestingly he was not gazetted in that position until after the 
truce in July 1921.His diaries which he kept of this period were published in 1998.They will be used in 
this article. However, he was careful to limit any specific references to Cope’s contacts to the leaders of 
Sinn Fein.       
10 A. Dulles ,The Craft of Intelligence, London Weidenfeld and Nicolson ,1963p122.  
11 A.A. Zuehike, What is Counter-intelligence? From Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s(ed 
R.Godson) London: Transaction Books,1980,.p15.    
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threat. He is alluding to the process of gathering, compiling, analyzing, 
and using CI information to support the countering operation.”12     
 
The question is to what extent do counter-intelligence concepts such as 
gathering, compiling and analyzing secret information provide some 
explanatory power to understand Cope’s activities in Ireland between 
1920 and 1921? There are also a number of associated questions which 
will be addressed. To what extent did his relationship with the leaders of 
the insurgency facilitate a British Government decision to progressively 
grant de facto legal immunity to the leaders of the insurgency? Did he 
systematically pass confidential information; including secret 
communication ciphers that endangered the lives of members of the 
Royal Irish Constabulary and undermined the effectiveness of police 
operations against the IRA?  It is important to acknowledge that 
identifying the key cause of something is not straightforward and needs 
careful qualification. As  Lewis has argued:”When we claim to have 
identified ‘the cause of something’ we are really making a claim about 
which part of the causal history is most salient for the purposes of some 
particular inquiry.”13          
 
To answer these questions it is necessary to make an assessment of the 
nature of the intelligence organisations that existed prior to 1919.In 
addition, an assessment of the efficacy of the new intelligence 
organisations that were set up in Ireland from 1920 onwards is also 
needed.  It will be argued that British intelligence community in Ireland 
located and identified accurately Cope’s developing relationship with the 
leaders of the insurgency. However, his activities proved impervious to 
any countering operation. Therefore both process and product are 
important. 
 
 How do we judge the effectiveness of intelligence during this period?  
There is the challenge of understanding the nature of intelligence itself. 
Laqueur summarised it in the following way: “On the one hand it 
(intelligence) refers to an organisation collecting information and on the 
other to the information that has been gathered.”14  Sherman Kent 
interpreted intelligence as both ‘a process and an end –product’. In 
addition, he developed the hypothesis that intelligence activity consists of 
two sorts of operation: “I have called them the surveillance operation, by 
which I mean the many ways by which the contemporary world is put 
                                                 
12 Ibid p15. 
13 D. Lewis. (check reference)  
14 Quoted in C. Andrew , R.J.Aldrich and W.K. Wark(eds) Secret Intelligence :A Reader, 
Abingdon:Routledge ,2009 p6.  
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under close and systematic observation, and the research operation. By 
the latter I mean the attempts to establish meaningful patterns out of what 
was observed in the past and attempts to get meaning out of what appears 
to be going on now.”15  
 David Kahn’s historical theory of intelligence draws attention to the 
extent that intelligence optimises resources.16 One of the accepted 
judgements about the insurgency during this period was that the 
intelligence resources of the British state did not have any tangible effect 
on the insurgency: “Neither the Army nor the police were able to build 
the essential foundation for success in guerrilla warfare, a dependable 
intelligence service.”17 Townshend fails to comment on one important 
dimension: a new intelligence community was created in the midst of an 
insurgency. Hart has argued that, the ‘nearly unanimous’ verdict on both 
the intelligence process and the end product has been as follows : ‘British 
intelligence’ out-witted and out-spied –emerges from most accounts of 
the revolution as a contradiction in terms: a disastrous compound of 
misdirection, malice and ignorance.”18 
 
This judgement runs like a golden thread through the published work on 
the intelligence aspect of the insurgency. There is a near universal 
disparagement of British intelligence in Ireland . O’Halpin has argued 
that: “intelligence activity after this (the murder of Alan Bell)19 was 
largely the preserve of organisations outside the direct control of the 
Castle authorities and of the conventional police, a situation which 
frequently produced chaos.”20 Andrew has condemned the whole period 
from 1916 to 1921 as an ‘Irish debacle’21.In his account of the period 
1920-1921, Cope is not mentioned once. Porch claimed that: “London’s 
security services were poorly positioned to deal with growing Irish 
unrest.”22 Foster has cited intelligence as the key force multiplier that 
made coherent all dimensions of the IRA’s efforts: “the diverse strategies 
of the IRA were linked by Collin’s legendary intelligence network, often 
                                                 
15 S. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 1965 p4 (finish details)    
16See D. Kahn ,An Historical Theory of Intelligence ,from P. Gill, S. Marrin, and M. Phythian, 
Intelligence Theory, Key Questions and Debates ,Abingdon :Routledge,2009 p 4-15.  
  
17  C. Townshend, The British Campaign In Ireland 1919-1921, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1975,p205.  
18 P. Hart (ed)British Intelligence in Ireland ,1920 -1921: The Final Reports ,Cork :Cork University 
press ,2002 p1   
19 Bell was a high ranking British civil servant who was murdered by the IRA  in Dublin in March 
1920.He was investigating their sources of funding.       
20 E. O’Halpin, The Decline of the Union, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan,1987.p199.   
21 C. Andrew, Secret Service, The Making of the British Intelligence Community , London: Spectre 
Books ,1986 pp354-372.   
22 D. Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New War,Cambridge :Cambridge 
University Press ,2013 p114.   
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utilizing individuals in a fairly high walk of life who openly boasted of 
their British connection.”23 Foy’s gave a more nuanced argument, 
although still in the slipstream of the dominant narrative. Critically, 
unlike most of the other accounts, he placed intelligence in its political 
context: “As events in Ireland demonstrated, intelligence can go a long 
way to denying victory. Ultimately the fault on the British side lay not in 
a dysfunctional and muddled intelligence system or personal inadequacies 
but with the politicians at the top. Indeed politicians caused many of the 
problems with which British intelligence officers had to grapple”.24  
Foy’s  assertion is right, as an understanding of the real political context 
intelligence organisations were having to operate in is crucial. It is only 
when this is understood that a degree of clarity can be given to two 
things. First what were the objectives that a small number of senior 
Dublin Castle civil servants and the Prime Minister working to? 
Secondly, the veracity of the assertion made by Paul Bew, that British 
intelligence operations in this period were designed principally to soften 
up the Sinn Fein leadership and make it more amenable will be 
challenged.25 
  
This article will argue that Cope was more than just a negotiator on 
behalf of His Majesty’s Government. It is intends to build on a series of 
judgements. Charles Townshend has claimed that Cope : “Working to 
secret instructions from Lloyd George, who often, in Cabinet, disowned 
his moves, Cope  tirelessly struggled to establish common ground for 
negotiations. But his dedication in this sphere limited his success in other 
directions, especially the vital one of liaison with the Army ”26 Peter Hart 
gave a different perspective and acknowledged that Cope’s ‘back-channel 
contacts’ led to a progressive  extension to the leaders of the insurgency 
of  de facto legal immunity”27. General Macready who was GOC in 
Ireland between 1920 and 1922 provided a less generous  judgement of 
Cope: “He was persona grata with the leaders of the rebellion, in whom 
he had a belief that was pathetic as, in my opinion, it was misplaced.”28     
    
Related to these diverse judgements are the  interpretations of  the 
character of the conflict itself. Many senior British policy makers 
perceived the political violence merely as the product of a ‘murder 
                                                 
23 R.F.Foster,Modern Ireland 1600-1972 ,London :Penguin Books,1988 p500.  
24 M. Foy ,Michael Collin’s Intelligence War, Stroud ;Sutton Publishing ,2006 p243. 
25 P. Bew, Moderate Nationalism and the Irish Revolution ,1916-1923,The Historical Journal Vol 42,3 
1999 p745.  
26 C, Townshend, British Campaign in Ireland ,Oxford :Oxford University Press,1975 p80   
27 Hart Op Cit p15 
28 N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol 2 , London: Hutchinson,1924 p493.   
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gang.’29Some also interpreted the insurgency as ‘an exceptional crime 
wave’. The British Army in 1921 evaluated it in the following way : “The 
situation in Ireland is partly guerrilla, partly rebellion, partly organized 
murder.”30 In February1920 the RIC referred to the insurgency as,” the 
guerrilla warfare of Sinn Fein.31”  Between 1919 and 1921 there was an 
insurgency in Ireland. O’Neill has outlined its dimensions as, a struggle 
between a non –ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-
ruling group consciously used political resources and violence to destroy, 
reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of 
politics.32 
O’Neill’s definition says nothing about the intelligence institutions that a 
state trying to counter this kind of violence needs to put in place. 
Popplewell has argued that the primary responsibility must fall to the 
police: “Good police intelligence was at the heart of counter-insurgency. 
This alone could nip the trouble in the bud, and this alone could provide 
the army with the information necessary for effective operations against 
the insurgents.”33 Frank Kitson, by contrast, developed a typology with 
respect to the varieties of intelligence that are required,” the first sort of 
information might be described as political intelligence, and the second 
sort as operational intelligence”.34  Keith Jeffrey formulated an alternative 
typology with respect to the intelligence required for anti–terrorist and 
counter–insurgency operations ”background intelligence, operational 
intelligence, and criminal intelligence.It is the third type of intelligence 
which most outstandingly distinguishes the use of intelligence in ‘low 
intensity’ conflict from its use in a conventional war.”35  
 
In 1919 Ireland had two police forces the Dublin Metropolitan Police and 
the Royal Irish Constabulary. They both lacked an intelligence capability 
to effectively respond to the emerging insurgency. The reason for this is 
that their capability had been systematically attacked by the insurgents. 
Specifically, the ‘G’ Division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, and the 
Crimes Special Branch of the Royal Irish Constabulary suffered  
sustained attrition. It was these circumstances that brought about two 
                                                 
29 Lloyd George (finish off ) 
30 Intelligence Conference  ,October 1921,Grosvenor Hotel Chester, Foulkes Papers 7/21,Liddel Hart 
Military Archives ,King’s College,London.  
31 Quoted in C. Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, Oxford :Oxford University Press, 
1975pp55. p   
32 B. O’Neill, Insurgency and  Revolution :Revolution to Apocalypse, Washington DC: Potamac Books 
,2005 p15.  
33 R. Popplewell. Lacking Intelligence: Reflections on Recent Approaches to British 
Counterinsurgency, Intelligence and National Security Vol 10, No2, 1995 p345. Some    
34 F. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, London: Faber& Faber, 1971 p72.    
35 K. Jeffrey ,Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British 
Experience ,Intelligence and National Security Jan 1987 ,Vol 2, No 1 p141.    
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important developments. First setting up of new all Ireland intelligence 
institutions to compensate for this intelligence deficit; secondly, the 
gradual involvement of the British Army in supporting the two police 
forces and the development of its own intelligence gathering structures 
that could both process intelligence and produce an end product. This 
article will not examine the British Army’s intelligence structures in any 
great detail except when it enables a better understanding of  Cope’s 
activities.36  
  
THE CONTEXT AND THE NEED 
 
On  21st January 1919 in Dublin, a city that was an integral part of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britian and Ireland, an extreme nationalist 
organisation- Sinn Fein made a unilateral declaration of independence.37 
This event took place in the Round Room of Dublin’s Mansion House. 
The Times commented:“The whole thing is, of course, childishly 
illegal.”38.It was UDI was rooted in the context of the ‘other’: “Whereas 
English rule in this country is, and always has been, based on force and 
fraud and maintained by military occupation against the declared will of 
the people”.39 Alongside this declaration there was a message to the ‘Free 
nations of the World’. This was imbued with a geographical determinism 
that viewed geography as destiny: “Her independence is demanded by the 
Freedom of the Seas: her harbours are empty and idle solely because 
English policy is determined to retain Ireland as a barren bulwark for 
English aggrandisement.”40   
 
 It was a reaffirmation of a bloody and failed coup d’etat that had taken 
place in April 1916. Beside this declaration there was an election of a 
‘cabinet’ and a ‘President’- Eamon d’Valera. A roll call was taken of the 
73 names who had been elected largely unopposed in the British General 
Election of  December 1918. A British Army report was specific as to 
why this situation had arisen: “Mainly as a result of intimidation, Sinn 
Fein secured the majority of seats, the representatives of other bodies 
being afraid to enter the lists.”41 The whole ceremony had an element of 
farce about it. Firstly, 36 of the 73 Sinn Fein MPs were serving custodial 
                                                 
36 Irish Command produced a staff history titled :A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-
1921.This was a two volume work that  covered both  operations and intelligence. Hart has claimed 
that the volume on intelligence is by far the most trustworthy source there is on the two police forces, 
albeit one written from a military perspective.         
37 This was an illegal declaration of independence that had no electoral mandate. 
38 The Times 21st Jan 1921. 
39 Declaration of Independence, 21st January 1919,Documents on Irish Foreign Policy ,Vol 1 1919-
1921p1.    
40 Ibid.p1 
41 General Remarks on the Rebellion in the 6th Divisional Area, 1921 Strickland Papers  IWM    
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sentences.42 Secondly, three of the ‘cabinet ministers’: de Valera , Griffith 
, and Countess Markievicz, had been imprisoned for their role in an 
attempt to collaborate with the Imperial German Government during 
Operation Michael.43 Michael Rast has argued that its  effect was not on 
the Britain, but on Irish nationalists themselves:”The British government 
did not see the Dáil as a serious enough threat to take active steps against 
it, but in republican minds a significant change took place on its 
establishment. Fighting for a government—though ridiculed and 
unrecognized legitimized the acts of aggression against Crown forces 
already taking place.”44 
 
 The nature of the UDI and the division of power in the republican 
movement can be gauged by the roles that were occupied by Michael 
Collins:“Being at the same time Minister of Finance responsible to the 
Dail, Director of Organization and, from June 1919,Director of 
Intelligence on the Executive of the Irish Volunteers, and finally 
President of the Supreme Council of the IRB, with notional leadership of 
the whole movement.”45 The geographical centre of gravity for this 
insurgency was Dublin and, to lesser extent, Cork. It was in the former 
city that that the various departments of the Dail were located and also 
the GHQ of the Irish Volunteers. These organisations functioned in 
backrooms, hidden offices, and were dependent on hidden files, and the 
movement of documents from one secret location to another.              
 
One of the first murders took place on the day that UDI was declared in 
Dublin. As is often the case with volatile and extreme insurgent 
organisations these killings were not sanctioned by  the leadership. In 
Soloheadbeg, just outside the town of Tipperary two members of the RIC 
who were escorting a civilian dynamite wagon to a quarry were shot dead 
by two members of the Irish Volunteers, Dan Breen and Sean Treacy: 
“The ambush contravened Volunteer GHQ’s official policy, and Mulcahy 
(chief of staff of the Irish Volunteers) privately denounced it as an 
irresponsible attempt by extremists to bounce the army leadership into an 
                                                 
42 C. Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland  1919-1921,Oxford :Oxford University Press 
1975.p14.  
43 As a consequence of  Operation Michael, the German offensive on the Western Front in March 1918 
the British Government felt it had no option but to introduce the Military Conscription Bill on the 9th 
April 1918.Its application to Ireland was delayed. Three days later Joe Dowling ,a former British POW, 
and now a member of the German ‘Irish Brigade ‘was arrested by the RIC as he landed from a German 
U-boat on the North Clare coast. His mission was to contact the leaders of Sinn Fein and promote the 
idea of another rebellion against the British authorities on the promise of a German expeditionary force 
being dispatched to Ireland.        
44 M. Rast, Tactics, Politics and Propaganda in the Irish War of Independence,1917-1921,MA  Georgia 
State University ,2011 p48.   
45 Townshend ,op cit, p17. 
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open war. He loathed the Tipperary leaders.”46 This pattern of behaviour 
continued in February 1919,when the ‘3rd Brigade’ of the Irish Volunteers 
ordered all members of the British Army and the RIC to leave South 
Tipperary. Mulcahy refused to sanction the proclamation, but this 
element went ahead anyway and made the proclamation public.  
It was Collins who was instrumental in increasing the tempo of the 
insurgency throughout 1919. At the beginning of that year there was not a 
demand for an insurgency, even from the bulk of Irish Republicans. 
Perhaps more importantly, there was not a desire or widespread support 
by the population for an insurgency. Yet Collins’s experience as a 
member of the secretive Irish Republican Brotherhood, prior to the 1916 
Irish rebellion had taught him how a ‘minority within a minority’47 could 
successfully manipulate a larger organisation into violent action. Foy has 
succinctly described his approach:” His strategy was to first create a  
radical coalition –a war party- by winning over Volunteer GHQ  and the 
Dublin Brigade, then create a war atmosphere by exploiting British 
Government mistakes and increasing popular frustration at political 
stagnation before bringing the crisis to a head through calculated acts of 
provocation.”48 
 
By April 1919 he had forged an alliance with Dick McKee an IRB 
member and ‘Director of Training’ at the Irish Volunteers GHQ. 
Critically McKee made his limited resources available to Collins. 
McKee’s access to Mulcahy also enabled him to cultivate the chief of 
staff. One of the lessons Collins had learnt from the 1916 Irish rebellion 
was witnessing how in the aftermath the detectives of ‘G’ Division of the 
Dublin Metropolitan Police were able to walk through a group of two 
thousand prisoners who were sitting on the floor of the gymnasium of 
Richmond barracks in Dublin and identify those prisoners who, from 
their intelligence, could be brought before a court martial under the 
Defence of the Realm Act. Collins was initially selected to join this 
group.49 
 
Every revolution or insurgency needs an enemy, more specifically it 
designates part of the population in this role.50 When Collins took over 
from Eamon Duggan as Director of Intelligence in January 1919 he began 
this process. The first designated enemy was the part of G division of the 
Dublin Metropolitan Police that was responsible for the detection of  
                                                 
46 M. Foy, Michael Collin’s Intelligence War, Stroud :Sutton Publishing,2006 p17.   
47 This phrase was coined by F.X. Martin in his seminal article on the Irish rebellion ,’The 1916 Rising 
Coup d’Etat or Bloody Protest ,Studies Hibernica,8 1968.  
48 Foy, op cit p18.  
49 See T.P. Coogan, Michael Collins, New York:Palgrave ,1990 p45-46.  
50 I am grateful to my colleague Dr Andreas Behnke for this insight.  
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political crime in the city. The Irish Volunteers had already recruited 
three junior members of ‘G’ division, who were acting as inside agents51 
for the Irish Volunteers. They were Eamon Broy, James Kavanagh, and 
Eugene Smith. Up until this period their ability to communicate 
actionable intelligence was limited. Collins initiated meetings with them 
on a personal basis, and then used Broy to gain access to two things that 
any intelligence organisation must keep secret: current sources and 
current methods. On 7th April 1919, Collins entered ‘G’ Division’s 
Brunswick Street headquarters. He was able to spend five hours having 
unrestricted access to all their intelligence records. Two days after this 
breach of security Collins was able to identify and coerce all the junior 
detectives responsible for political crime. The IRA threatened that they 
would be murdered unless they agreed to desist from undertaking any 
further intelligence gathering operations against the IRA. In addition, 
they were informed that they could continue to undertake investigations 
into ordinary crime.52 There was still a hard core of experienced 
detectives who were not easily intimated. They were Detective Sergeants 
Holly, Hoey, Barton and Smyth. Broy considered Smyth to be the most 
experienced. Collins with Mulcahy’s endorsement decided to murder 
them. Despite Rast’s claim that the Dail legitimized the acts of aggression 
against Crown forces, Collins attack on’ G’ Division  was: “ unauthorised 
by the Dail government and far ahead of mainstream republican thinking. 
It was something that he had to conceal from almost all his colleagues 
and superiors.”53   
 
The period April to September 1919 saw an increase in the tempo of 
violence and intimidation. In April Sinn Fein designated the RIC as a 
target when it initiated a boycott of this national police force. This was 
not an easy thing for the IRA to undertake as Broy admitted : “The mere 
fact that these men were rather decent men in peaceful times made them 
all the more a menace when the national resurgence burst forth , and it 
took some time and some exhortation to convince local people that the 
RIC were really enemies.”54  Very soon afterwards three policemen were 
murdered in Tipperary. The government’s response was to proscribe Sinn 
Fein in that county only. The attacks on the RIC were motivated by a 
desire to eliminate its intelligence collection capability. Outside Dublin 
the RIC performed a unique intelligence function: “A particular menace 
to the Volunteers was the small area, policed by one sergeant and five 
                                                 
51 This phrase comes from Sun Tzu’s typology of human intelligence. See The Art of War chapter 
thirteen.  
52 Foy ,op cit p22. 
53 Op Cit Rast  p25. 
54 Witness Statement by Eamon Broy No 1280 Bureau of Military Affairs ,Military Archives Cathal 
Brugha Barracks, Dublin, 1955.  
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constables. The police in this case knew almost everything about every 
native of the area, and when a prominent Volunteer officer from Dublin 
came to the area, although previously unknown to the police in Dublin, 
was soon noted by the RIC as a stranger.”55  These attacks and 
destruction of these small police stations were to cause serious gaps in 
intelligence capability. In the first three months of 1920; “Over 400 
isolated police barracks were destroyed, and the Constabulary was 
concentrated, and immobilized, behind steel shutters in the larger 
buildings; and by May of that year some eighty members of the RIC and 
detectives in the Dublin Metropolitan Police had been murdered without 
any assassin being brought to justice.”56 A British Army report written in 
1921 noted the consequences of this action: “In 1919, they commenced 
their attacks on the RIC; they murdered them, they boycotted their 
families, they drove them from small isolated barracks. With what  
result? Police were recruited in England, and the British Army was drawn 
into the fray.”57 
 
In Dublin two more of  ‘G’ division’s core of experienced detective 
sergeants were murdered between July and September on Collins’s 
orders: Smyth and Hoey. The tipping point in terms of a government 
response came from an unexpected quarter, and was a reaction to yet 
another murder. This time a soldier from a small party of the King’s 
Shropshire Light Infantry was killed as he was on the way to church in 
Fermoy, County Cork. It was the first fatality of a soldier since the 
rebellion of 1916.  On 11th September a letter from George V to the Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George demanded to know: “what the government was 
doing to do to protect the lives of suffering people in Ireland and what 
measures were to be brought into parliament for the government of the 
country.”58 The next day it was announced that Dail Eireann was to be 
declared illegal. This meant that all the ’government departments’ of Dail 
Eireaan and the Volunteer GHQ had to go underground. This necessitated 
moving to secret offices throughout Dublin and this was facilitated by 
Michael Noyk, a Jewish solicitor and Trinity College graduate.59 Michael 
Collins calculated acts of provocation had been successful of bringing 
about the confrontation and insurgency he wanted. Furthermore, he was 
eroding the capacity of the police both in Dublin and in the rest of Ireland 
to provide intelligence on the IRA. David Galula has summed up the 
process that was underway: “an insurgency is usually slow to develop and 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 O. Winter, Winter’s Tale, London: Richards Press,1955 p291.   
57 General Remarks on the Rebellion in the 6th Divisional Area, Strickland Papers, IMW P3(CHECK)  
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is not an accident, for in an insurgency leaders appear and then the 
masses are made to move.”60     
 
ALFRED COPE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE 
 
 Alfred Cope’s arrival in Dublin May 1920 was a fusion of two political 
failures on the part of the British state. The first was a decline in the 
legitimacy or social authority in the governance of Ireland as an integral 
part of the United Kingdom. This was not a new phenomenon. It had 
been highlighted by the Royal Commission on the Irish rebellion which 
had published its findings in May 1916: “The main cause of the rebellion 
appears to be the lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and 
that Ireland for several years past has been administered on the principle 
that it was safer and more expedient to leave the law in abeyance if 
collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided. 
Such a policy is the negation of the cardinal rule of Government which 
demands that enforcement of law and preservation of order should always 
be independent of political expediency.”61These findings also exposed a 
pivotal weakness of the Royal Commission process. It had legally 
binding investigative powers, but it lacked any mechanisms of 
enforcement whereby the Asquith Government or any subsequent 
governments could be compelled to remedy these failings. 
 
An insight of how far the legitimacy of government had been allowed to 
become subordinate to political preferences was given by Augustine 
Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland from 1906 to his sacking in 1916: 
“I had seen my own policy clearly from the first. It was to pave the way 
for Home Rule (on more or less Gladstonian lines), and to do all that in 
me lay to make any other solution of the problem impossible”.62 
 
General Macready, although not in Ireland during the rebellion, identified 
a direct link between the rebellion and the insurgency that gathered pace 
after 1919 and the responsibility of British policy makers for their 
handling of the aftermath of 1916.63  This was compounded by a malaise 
that Colonel Foulkes64 discerned: “By the end of the First World War 
they (the police) had not been in a position to enforce the law. For 
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example stop poaching, cars been driven at night without lights, cattle on 
the road grazing, bicycles on the footpath. They had lost their prestige. 
By the end of 1919 the two police forces were far from being an effective 
force. They then found themselves in small detachments and isolated; 
boycotted by Sinn Fein threatened, abused and murdered.”65  
   
The second reason for Cope’s appointment was the posting of a new 
GOC for Ireland. In March 1920, General Shaw had been replaced by 
General Macready, a personal choice of the Prime Minister Lloyd 
George.66 Since his arrival in Dublin he had sent a series of reports stating 
that, “administrative chaos seems to reign here, where the machine was 
hopelessly out of gear.”67 The government’s response was to ask Sir 
Warren Fisher, the Head of the Civil Service, to examine the functioning 
of Dublin Castle, the centre of British administration. Fisher arrived on  
4th May with a two man team. R.E. Harwood from the Treasury, and 
Alfred Cope then still working in the Ministry of Pensions. The main 
focus was the workings of the office of the Chief Secretary. The report 
was completed on 12th May. Out of this report came a series of new 
appointments of which Cope’s was to be but one. The new Under 
Secretary was Sir John Anderson, then Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue. Cope was appointed Assistant Under Secretary along with 
Mark Sturgis from the Treasury.68 Anderson and his team arrived in 
Dublin on 22nd of May 1921.An insightful portrait of  Cope and his 
political preferences was given by Macready who was to interact with 
him constantly in the next two years: “a tireless worker, highly strung, a 
firm believer in self –government for Ireland… and feverishly anxious to 
do all in his power ,even at the risk of his life, to ensure the success of Mr 
Lloyd George’s policy, his somewhat irritable shortness of manner and an 
insufficiency of official oil when the waters became troubled made him 
decidedly unpopular with many of those with whom he came in 
contact.”69  
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Bew has claimed that this set of appointments signalled a pivotal shift in 
the political preferences of the administration in Dublin Castle. ”A new 
clique was created which governed policy. A network was instituted 
involving ‘flexible’ Irish officials like W.E. Wylie, the crown prosecutor 
and G.C. Duggan of Dublin Castle; above all, new English officials like 
Sir John Anderson and Andy Cope, now the driving force in Dublin 
Castle. This group worked closely with Philip Kerr in the prime 
minister’s office. Sir Basil Thomson, at Scotland Yard and C.J. Philips 
,chief assistant to the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon.”70 Four years after 
the findings of the Royal Commission there was now installed in Dublin 
Castle, yet another group of civil servants, who would ensure that again 
the enforcement of law and preservation of order would be subordinated 
to political expediency: the antithesis of ‘the cardinal rule of 
Government’. Bew has  challenged the accepted judgements of Irish 
historians who have characterised British policy as one of 
incoherence.71He has argued that this new group had a confidence to 
worship at the altar of treating with the insurgents and bring Lloyd 
George to it as well: “this group had a clear picture of the settlement from 
the outset and a confidence in their ability to deliver, in the end, the prime 
minister.”72 This latter claim pivots on some understanding of Lloyd 
George’s existing views on the governance of Ireland. Prior to this period 
there is evidence to suggest that he was a firm believer in what could be 
described as a limited devolution: “Lloyd George had from his earliest 
days as a Welsh nationalist maintained one consistent principle of Irish 
policy –that Home Rule would not mean separation. He believed like 
Joseph Chamberlain in the strategic and fiscal unity of the United 
Kingdom. The war and the deep concern it brought with it about the 
strategic safety of the British Isles only strengthened his resolve on that 
point.”73       
 
When General Macready arrived in April 1920 he assessed that the 
effectiveness of ‘G’ Division had been blunted by what he described as 
‘systematic murder’, and the RIC was in a state of ‘disintegration.’74 In 
terms of destroying the effectiveness of police intelligence gathering 
capabilities Michael Collins made an assumption that the murder of these 
detectives and policemen would bring about a deficit of intelligence that  
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could never be filled: “even when the new spy stepped into the shoes of 
the old one, he could not step into the old one’s knowledge.”75 
What is remarkable about this period from May 1920 to July 1921- just 
over 14 months - is how wrong Collins was. In reality the British were 
able to build up and expand an effective intelligence organisation very 
quickly. 
  
An example of what the Army’s sub rosa intelligence organisation had 
been able to achieve is illustrated by a secret memo, dated the 6th August 
1920, from General Macready to Sir John Anderson, the new Under 
Secretary. It contains clear evidence that the army had managed to 
capture policy documents that came from the top of the  Republican 
movement : “Brind (a staff officer at GHQ) sent to the Castle yesterday 
copies of some most important correspondence that we have got hold of, 
laying down the policy that is being carried out by our76 Arthur Griffiths 
in regard to the establishment of the Republican Government.”77  
 
An intelligence organisation that had been set up in June 1920 was called 
the Special Branch Dublin District, and commanded by Lt Col Walter 
Wilson: “Wilson divided the Dublin district into six areas under head 
agents whose cells of Special Branch officers and civilian informers 
collected information on IRA personnel, Volunteer arms dumps 
,operations, safe houses, and potential targets as well as reporting on the 
state of enemy morale. They also tried locating the Dail, Volunteer GHQ 
and the Dublin Brigade offices and leading republicans like Collins and 
Mulcahy.”78 It was set up as a response to the increasing tempo of the 
insurgency and to compensate for the intelligence vacuum that was left 
by the ineffectiveness of  ‘G ’Division of the DMP: “ In the early summer 
of 1920 intelligence primacy still lay with the army, and, as a result of 
increasing IRA attacks on soldiers ,many officers volunteered for 
intelligence duty. Dublin Military District’s intelligence branch was 
reorganised and a plain clothes section known as Special Branch Dublin 
District created to collect military and political information in the 
capital.” 79 The hallmark of its success can be judged by two criteria: 
material captured and arrests made. More importantly, its officers were to 
carry out the first, albeit inadvertent, counter-intelligence operation that 
was to locate and identify Cope’s relationship with Sinn Fein and produce  
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prima facia evidence of his willingness to leak confidential information 
to the insurgents. Another important point that needs to be made is that 
his activities were unmasked largely because of the paradox that lies at 
the heart of counter –intelligence: “Although the purpose of counter-
espionage is defensive, its methods are essentially offensive”.80      
 Captain Robert Jeune was a member of Special Branch Dublin District. 
His testimony conveyed the offensive methods used by the army in 
Dublin to  counter the intelligence deficit they faced in the first half of 
1920 : “A rather hastily improvised intelligence organisation was formed 
,of which I was a member, and after a short course of instruction at 
Hounslow, we were sent over to Dublin in the early summer of 1920.”81 
The aim of this new unit was both to put in place both a process and an 
end product: “the work consisted of getting to know the town thoroughly, 
tailing the ‘Shinners’, and carrying out the small raids ,with a view to 
collecting all possible information which lead us eventually to stamping 
out the revolt.”82It was through the use of this tactic that Cope’s activities 
first came to light: “In September 1920, a raid took place which had a 
significant result. It was decided to raid several houses in the Drumcondra 
area. Particular attention was paid to the house of a man called O’Connor, 
known to us as an active Sinn Feiner…There was no hostile reception, 
however, and the search went on. While this was happening I was 
standing talking to Boddington, who was in charge of the raid, when a 
letter was brought to him which he read and handed to me saying: 
‘Money for Jam’. It was on official Dublin Castle paper and was in these 
words: 
               
                           Dear Mr O’Connor,     
                                        I am having the papers you require  
                                         sent up to you. 
                                                                Yours sincerely  
                                                                  A.W. Cope 
 
This was distinctly interesting. Here was the Assistant Under Secretary 
writing to a notorious Sinn Feiner ,with whom he had obviously already 
been in contact. After this I made a point of trying to find out more about 
this individual’s doings, and found that he had done some rather strange 
things, such as arranging for some electricians of known Sinn Fein views 
to come into the Castle at unusual times.83 Also he was one of the very 
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few castle officials who could safely walk about the streets of Dublin. But 
it was decided that no drastic action could be taken against him ,as it 
turned out he was a protégé of Lloyd George, who picked him out of 
Fisheries(it was Pensions)and sent him over to Ireland under Sir John 
Anderson in order to get a foot in the Sinn Fein Camp.”84  
 
Within four months of his appointment, Cope was passing information 
much of it secret to Sinn Fein, and giving its members unauthorised 
access to Dublin Castle. His ability to do this was a direct consequence of 
the role that he had carved out for himself. Sturgis’s diary for  22nd 
September 1920 revealed the institutional channel he  used: “He (Cope) 
has now taken over RIC transport and correspondence branch en bloc! 
I’m not sure he has not done his reorganisation Castle job ( as nobody 
else could).”85 Cope was to inject a highly damaging disconnect  into the 
governance of this part of the United Kingdom. The smooth and sustained 
functioning of a key relationship was undermined: “the relationship 
between strategy and its enabling tactics requires, as a matter of absolute 
need, that policy needs, which is to say political choices, provide both 
legitimacy and practical guidance”.86 Cope was to provide  neither. 
 
In May 1920 the British government considered that the intelligence 
deficit that both police forces faced required further augmentation. To 
this end they appointed Brigadier–General Ormonde Winter as Deputy 
Chief of Police. This title was a cover for his real role which was Chief of 
the Combined Intelligence Services. Sturgis described him in the 
following way:” ‘O’ is a marvel-he looks like a wicked little white snake 
and can do everything! He is an Artillery Colonel and commanded a 
Division of artillery in France; in India, they say, he was tried for murder 
for a little escapade when doing secret service work. He started a race 
course near Calcutta and made a pot o’ money...When a soldier who 
knew him in India heard he was coming to Ireland he said ‘God Help 
Sinn Fein, they don’t know what they are up against.”87 Winter also had 
to liaise with Scotland Yard, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the 
Military Intelligence Officers and the Crime Special Department of the 
RIC. 
   
Winter made quick progress in gaining highly personalised information  
on the movements of Michael Collins. By  3rd September 1920 ,only four 
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months after his arrival in Ireland, Sturgis revealed the extent of the 
inroads he had made : “ ‘O’ is on the track of Michael (Collins)-he was 
amusing about a report he wanted to send to the Under Secretary (Sir 
John Anderson) but couldn’t as it would have said that Michael slept with 
a girl , address known , once a week ,and this he shrank from dictating to 
his chaste female shorthand writer. So he had to give his news by word of 
mouth.”88What is curious is that no evidence can be found of this 
intelligence being actioned by Anderson.  
 
As Chief of Combined Intelligence Services Winter’s most important 
innovation was the setting up of two new intelligence organisations: the 
Central Office of Intelligence and the Central Raid Bureau and a number 
of supporting yet related organisations. The first one covered the whole of 
Ireland in terms of its geographical scope, and was divided into a number 
of sub organisations. In a report that Winter wrote titled: The 
‘Intelligence Branch of the Chief of Police’89 he gave an insight to the 
structures and how they worked:”A Central Office was formed, through 
which all information should pass, be tabulated90 and disseminated. 
Outside Police Centres were linked up to the Central Office by the 
formation of Local Intelligence Centres, which were responsible for 
collecting and passing on information between the Army and the Police, 
and formed the necessary branches of the main trunk. For convenience of 
control, these were situated at the Headquarters of Divisional 
Commissioners of the RIC. Police information was augmented, as far as 
possible, by the employment of chosen agents, and a Bureau was 
established in London , under special cover, to deal with all sources of 
information other than those obtained through ordinary channels ,to 
collect information and pass it to the Central Bureau.”91What is worth 
emphasizing is the relative speed with which this structure was set up - in 
just six months .The first Local Intelligence Centre was functioning in 
Belfast by January 1921.Between March and April LICs were operational 
in Limerick, Kildare, Athlone, Galway, and Dundalk. The last one was in 
Clonmel was functioning by July 1921.Winter acknowledged that the 
greatest challenge was recruitment: “The difficulty of obtaining and 
training suitable personnel somewhat retarded the formation of Local 
Centres ,and the last one to be formed was only established at Clonmel a 
week before the Truce.”92 He was aware also of the security challenge  
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faced with respect to recruitment: “The selection of suitable members for 
the Central Intelligence Bureau presented many serious obstacles. As a 
precautionary measure the personnel for the clerical services were all 
selected from individuals of English extraction, whose antecedents and 
activities were carefully screened by Scotland Yard. Nearly all the 
stenographers employed were women, and the male staff were all ex-
officers of the Army or Navy.”93 
 
The second institution was the Central Raid Bureau, which was 
functioning by October 1920.This had an important role in that it enabled 
Courts Martial officers to gather evidence that could be used to prosecute 
members of the IRA. A point that has often overlooked in the existing 
literature.94 More importantly, Winter understood the importance of 
organised searches in terms of providing accurate and timely intelligence: 
“The word of an informer is, very frequently, unreliable, but the evidence 
deduced from a captured document is tangible, and can generally be 
regarded as conclusive. It was mainly documentary evidence that enabled 
the authorities to obtain and hold, in the face of appeals, the vast number 
of internees ,and led to the successful prosecution of many agitators. 
Endeavours were made to inculcate into all concerned the value of 
forwarding to the Central Bureau all documents captured in raids.”95  
 
There was also an understanding of the need to subject raw intelligence to 
a process of analysis and the implications that it could have for fighting 
the insurgency: “Letters seized in one part of Ireland were often 
meaningless, but, when compared with documents, in a similar 
handwriting, captured in another locality, either afforded valuable clues 
or led to the prosecution of the writer.”96 . ‘Collation’ as Winter described 
it led to arrests of what he described as ‘political criminals’ and their 
subsequent internment or imprisonment. This resulted in an intelligence 
boost as the threat of interment would illicit more intelligence from 
suspects. Information was obtained that led the framing of charges or 
providing direction for further action. This in turn brought about more 
organisational innovation: “A Legal Branch, with a staff of interrogators, 
was formed, which put up cases for interment or prosecution. This dealt 
with cases in Dublin District, whilst the Officers in charge of the Local 
Centres functioned in a similar way in respect to the country, as soon as 
the Local Centres were established”.97 The effectiveness can be gauged 
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from the fact that in the Dublin District alone from 21st November 1920, 
to 21st February, 1921,a period of three months ,1745 arrests were 
effected. Furthermore, from December 1920 to June 1921, 310 revolvers 
,34 rifles ,20 shot guns ,many thousands of rounds of ammunition, and a 
large quantity of bombs ,explosives and detonators were recovered.98   
 
These intelligence organisations were highly dependent on one source of 
intelligence above all else: the capture of documents. This would 
primarily be achieved through organised searches. This was recognised 
by the GOC in Ireland, General Macready: “It must be remembered also 
that most of our Intelligence comes from raids or from the result of 
captures made when actively engaged with the rebels. Some of my people 
put the proportion of Intelligence so obtained as high as eighty per cent of 
the total information received.”99 The Raid Bureau was staffed by clerical 
staff who had been vetted by Scotland Yard. In terms of processing the 
captured documents Winter set up a two part process. The first was the 
recording, collating, analysing and assessing for necessary action all the 
documents that had been seized. The second was the production and 
distribution of what were called epitomes100.These could then be accessed 
by the police and army who could use them to undertake further action. 
 
 These epitomes provided the basis of actionable intelligence. They 
provided a summary of recently captured documents, or a quote from one 
that was judged to be of particular pertinence. They could act as a trigger 
mechanism whereby a military or police unit could call for the original 
document if they thought they would act as a basis for further action. 
Winter gives a sense of both the scale and the success of this 
organisation: “Some idea of the amount of work involved may be 
gathered from the fact that in the Dublin District area from October 1920 
to July 1921, 6,311 raids and searches were carried out, and over 1200 
epitomes of captured documents, some consisting of over 200 pages of 
foolscap were circulated.”101  
 
In an assessment of the IRA’s intelligence capabilities, written by the 
British Army in 1922 these organised searches were judged to be one of 
three reasons why the accepted judgement of eulogising  the IRA’s use of 
intelligence needs to be understood in a more sober light: “With almost 
every advantage Sinn Fein intelligence was not as good as it might have 
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been. This was mainly due to their ignorance of the principles of 
organisation. It was also due to constant raiding and searching by the 
Crown Forces, which made it impossible to establish an office where 
records and files could be kept in safety and to the fact that most 
subordinate officers and the rank and file were apathetic about the service 
of information.”102 .  
 
Another weakness was a consequence of the relative lack of technology 
accessible during this period. The IRA could not avoid committing 
information to paper in the absence of any other medium or technology of 
communication. Verbal communication except for messages containing 
no more than a few words were always liable to corruption in terms of 
understanding .Written documents were the main medium of 
communication and as Winter understood they were always vulnerable to 
capture. In addition, he believed that there were ethnic proclivities at play 
which advantaged the security forces: “It was fortunate that the Irish had 
an irresistible habit of keeping records. They would hide them in the most 
unexpected places, but they seldom evaded discovery by the trained 
sleuth; and by this time the Dublin District Service men became 
outstanding experts.”103   
 
 ALFRED COPE AND THE LEADERS OF THE INSURGENCY: THE 
SECRETS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.  
         
 Two salient points can be made with respect to the intelligence 
organisations that Winter set up. First they provided a unique perspective 
on counter-intelligence. It underlined the importance of what has 
previously been called ’counter-intelligence information’.104 This was a 
process of gathering, recording, collating, analyzing, and using CI 
information to support operations to counter the insurgency. It was a 
result of this process the Central Raid Bureau could follow Cope’s 
developing relationship with Sinn Fein. There were now in place 
intelligence organisations that could provide what Kent had termed 
surveillance and research operations.  
 
Secondly, this framework enables the dominant teleological narrative of 
British incompetence and mendacity as far as intelligence operations 
were concerned to be challenged. Evidence of both types of counter-
intelligence operations  can be gauged by Sturgis’s diary entry for 16th 
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November 1920:”A raid last night (15th November) on the house of the 
IRA ‘Chief of Staff’ called Mulcahy has been productive of some 
amazing stuff .The gent himself succeeded in getting away in his 
nightshirt, which is a pity but the papers seized give evidence of the most 
thorough and complete plots to murder individuals, poison troops, horses 
etc.-to blow up the Manchester Ship Canal ,etc, etc.”105There was also 
evidence recovered that led to IRA bank accountants: “Wilson (Head of 
the Special Branch Dublin Military District) came in hot after Mulcahy’s 
money –he also it seems has an account or accounts in the Bank at our 
gates in different names. Wilson and Wynne had their heads together for 
an hour and I hope settled satisfactorily the least illegal way of bagging 
the stuff.”106.This intelligence demonstrated that in a relatively short 
period , operational level IRA networks, such as their bank accountants, 
were being uncovered and subverted. Furthermore, there was an 
understanding of the need to exploit these captured documents as quickly 
as possible this establishing a tempo of operations. Three days after the 
raid on Mulcahy’s house, on 19th November, follow up organised 
searches were launched with a  specific agenda:”Among the Mulcahy’s 
papers is a list of 200 gun men, names and addresses and classified as 
very good shots ,good shots etc. We are out raiding tonight for these 
beauties and will have them on the run anyway if they’ve taken fright and 
bolted.”107   
 
   Six days after this raid, the IRA responded. On Sunday 21st November 
1920, 12 intelligence and courts martial officers were murdered, and 
another five were wounded, some in front of their wives, in a series of co-
ordinated attacks on civilian addresses and one hotel in the centre of 
Dublin. There is an extensive literature on this event and it is not intended 
to restate the narrative of these events.108 These killings are often 
interpreted as a turning point in the whole campaign.109Hart has 
challenged this interpretation: “The information it was based on was 
imperfect and some of those shot had nothing to do with spying or 
trails.”110This raises the question why Collins launched these attacks? 
There are two answers: first in a veryshort period of time British 
intelligence operations had put pressure on the leaders of the insurgency 
and their organisation. Captain Robert Jeune provided the best insight to 
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this. He had received unspecified warnings concerning the attacks that 
took  place on the 21st November: “In November, (1920 ) information 
was coming in well and we were beginning to get on top of the IRA, who 
were becoming desperate. I happened to receive information from three 
different sources to the effect that something was going to happen, but 
there was nothing definite.”111.The intelligence officers who were killed 
had set up and were running networks of Irishmen to provide information 
on the IRA. This is attested to by James Cahill one of the IRA gunmen: 
“Our intelligence had located the chief British intelligence officers who 
were living in various hotels throughout the city. (this is not true, as the 
bulk were in private lodgings.) Each officer had a number of spies or 
touts who kept him supplied with information. It was planned to shoot all 
of those intelligence officers the next morning.”112        
 
Important changes in the legal system had taken place since August 
1920.In that month the British government enacted the Restoration of 
Order in Ireland Act .This act replaced the civil judiciary with a courts 
martial system. These courts were empowered to try people for treason, 
treasonable felony and felony. More importantly Courts Martial officers 
began building cases against members of the IRA and prominent 
Republicans. It was the confluence of access to accurate intelligence and 
the work of the Courts Martial officers that was squeezing the IRA: “The 
object of this exercise(the murders of the 21st November) on the part of 
the IRA ,was to eliminate Intelligence and Courts Martial officers 
,because the gunmen felt that the net was closing round them. So men 
were brought up to Dublin from other parts of the country, particularly 
Tipperary, in order to catch as many as possible of us unawares on a 
Sunday morning, when most people slept late.”113  
 
There is no doubt that these killings caused a halt in the intelligence 
activities of the Special Branch, Dublin Military District.: “As a result of 
all this, those of us who had survived were shut up under guard in a hotel 
,from where it was impractical to do any work. In fact our job had to all 
intents and purposes been done, and the organisation was breaking up.”114  
 
Hart has argued that Collin’s achievements were more modest and did not 
go beyond the tactical:“His sources rarely gave him useful operational 
intelligence other than warning of some raids and spies. He did not 
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acquire any particular insight into British planning or intentions.”115  
Furthermore, he has argued that ‘Bloody Sunday’ was not the 
‘Napoleonic masterstroke’ of Irish Republican legend: “Rather than 
bringing relief, the shootings actually precipitated the worst setback yet 
for the rebels at the hands of British intelligence. Military and police 
intelligence officers had by now identified most of their opponents. 
Raiding parties were unleashed all over Ireland to round up known IRA 
officers and activists and detention camps were hurriedly established to 
receive the large numbers of men caught in the net. Informers sprang up 
once again and arms were found in unprecedented numbers.”116 Hart’s 
judgement is confirmed by a conversation that took place in January 
1921. Captain Jeune met General Boyd, GOC Dublin District, on the boat 
train to Holyhead. They both concurred that another six months would 
see the IRA unable to sustain the insurgency.117 Jeune also provides a 
reference, albeit an oblique one, to the forces that were to derail the 
progress that British intelligence and the security forces had made against 
the IRA: “ by the early summer  (1921) the IRA, were driven into the 
south west corner of Ireland, and would have been quickly finished. But 
certain influences were to save them.”118  
 
What these ‘certain influences’ were can be found in the epitomes that 
were compiled by the Central Raid Bureau. They provided a counter-
intelligence on a senior British civil servant and demonstrated he was in 
contact with the leaders of the insurgency. It is clear that he did not make 
the headway he would have liked. In a raid that took place on 16th 
December 1920,the raid epitome stated: “21(6) Slighting reference to 
Cope by J.E. Duggan to Michael Collins.”119 This lack of trust needs to 
be understood in the context of the challenges that Collin’s own 
intelligence network was having to respond to. By the end of 1920 the 
detection of political crime had been transferred from the DMP to Dublin 
Castle. In addition, sustaining the low grade sources inside G Division 
had become problematic. One of his sources, Kavanagh had died after an 
appendix operation. During a raid by the Auxiliary Division of the RIC 
on New Year’s Eve 1920 on a flat in Dawson Street, documents were 
found that linked Broy to the IRA.120 They included:”Broy’s copies of G 
Division reports which were well over a year old and should have been 
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destroyed.”121 More importantly the Auxiliaries had discovered an 
important IRA hub. The flat was the home of Eileen McGrane, who acted 
as a private secretary to Collins. She was storing a mass of intelligence 
documents in her flat. The importance of this raid can be gauged from the 
fact that it was one of the few covered in detail in Winter’s 
autobiography: “accompanying her(to Dublin Castle) was a van load of 
captured documents ,together with three automatics and a quantity of 
ammunition .The fact that the epitome of these documents occupied 356 
pages of closely typed foolscap, was indicative of the number of her 
activities, whilst the nature of the contents added considerably to our 
volume of intelligence.”122   
 
A key challenge that Cope faced was one of establishing trust. This was 
compounded by a modus operandi  that attempted to ensure that Sinn 
Fein would put forward  political demands that would enable the British 
government to respond in a manner that would deflect  any accusation 
that they were acceding to Sinn Fein’s demand of a fully independent 
Irish Republic. An early British position was that there could be no truce 
unless arms were surrendered. One of the few insights to these exchanges 
was given by Frank Gallagher.123He cited a communication written by 
Collins on 14th December 1920 to Arthur Griffith and a number of 
Republican prisoners124: “We have clearly demonstrated our willingness 
to have peace on honourable terms .Lloyd George insists on capitulation. 
Between these there is no mean.”125  
 
 Cope continued to search for channels that he could both use and 
manipulate:” Irishmen in the Crown service were used as contacts by 
Cope in his secret efforts to bring about peace. Cope was in his element 
in these undercover activities but lacked the stability and perception to 
bring them to a successful conclusion.”126 He also attempted to impute 
onto Sinn Fein what were in reality British negotiating positions. In 
January 1921, Father O’Flanagan, the Vice President of Sinn Fein was an 
example of this :”Cope said that Father O’Flanagan would propose a 
settlement to Lloyd George on the lines of Dominion Home Rule”.127 
These ‘peace plots’ as Sturgis referred to them continued in the midst of 
the insurgency. Nine days after the raid on McGrane’s flat, and the 
operational triumph that this represented, the British government 
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embarked, in secret, on negotiations that drove a wedge between policy 
and strategy and the activities of the police and army. Although, as 
Strachan has argued, strategy and policy are distinct in theory, in practice 
strategy rests on a dialogue with policy.128 Cope’s activities underlined a 
clear abandonment of strategic logic. It is the same for regular and 
irregular wars, the deployment and use of armed force to develop an 
effect sufficient to modify the enemy’s will. Cope’s objective was the 
antithesis of this. A demonstration of this was given on  9th January 1921, 
the Prime Minister Lloyd George ,Cope and Sturgis were involved in a: 
“very secret interview was arranged for that morning between the PM, 
O’Connor and Father O’Flanaghan and that the two Irishmen would have 
a preliminary rendezvous in the Treasury with Andy and myself and that 
probably the Chief Secretary would come in. As we talked Andy was 
saluted by an insignificant looking little man with a black moustache and 
a tall well set young looking priest-Lord Justice O’Connor, Master of the 
Rolls and Father O’Flanaghan, Acting Vice President of the Irish 
Republic. ”129  
 
The communications between Irish Republicans that preceded this 
meeting revealed both insecurity and fear of being manipulated by the 
British. In a letter to Art O’Brien130 dated 5th January Collins revealed his 
suspicions: “To be plain about it Cope is lying. He must know that the 
Castle authorities made the approach to Fr O’F.”131 In secret and at the 
highest level the government was willing to negotiate in the midst of a 
violent insurgency. Sturgis revealed the outcome of this meeting in his 
diary: “Father O’Flanagan is ready to stump Ireland against the Republic, 
in favour of working the Home Rule Act plus ‘fiscal autonomy.’”132  
 
 The ‘Castle group’ of civil servants from January to July 1921, the date 
of the truce, had brought about a dangerous disconnect in the governance 
of this part of the United Kingdom. Sturgis articulated clearly the length 
they were prepared to go: “there is the feeling that many of them (Sinn 
Fein) are murders with whom we cannot treat.....Still I can’t deviate in 
my opinion that give these people a little now and they are to that extent 
men bribed, and men bribed are always a bit under one’s thumb.”133  If 
there was one decision that encapsulated this tendency, it was the 
extension of de facto legal immunity to de Valera. Macready has claimed 
that as soon as he arrived back in Ireland from the United States, in the 
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first week of January 1921, he received instructions from Dublin Castle 
that he was not to be interfered with or arrested134  
 
However, he was wrong about the institutional source of this immunity.  
Sir John Anderson, the Under Secretary in Dublin Castle gave a more 
accurate indication to the Irish Situation Committee:”The fact that de 
Valera had been in or near Dublin for many months, the Irish Authorities 
had continually received information regarding meetings which De 
Valera attended personally in company of other rebels who were badly 
wanted. It had been impossible to raid these meetings in view of the 
Cabinet instructions....These restrictions had a hampering effect far 
beyond the immediate inhibitions imposed.” 135 Anderson’s statement 
underscored the accuracy of the intelligence the Irish authorities were 
receiving and the corrosive effect on counter- insurgency measures that  
the cabinet level immunity was having. Edward Holt has asserted that 
Dublin Castle was fully appraised of de Valera’s whereabouts during this 
period :” When de Valera was using a doctor’s house in Merrion Square 
as his supposedly a secret hide-out and he was there summoned  to the 
telephone by a voice which coolly asked : “May I speak to Mr de 
Valera?”This is Alfred Cope, speaking from Dublin Castle.”136  
 
The immunity granted to de Valera by a British cabinet needs to be 
understood in the context of the relentless attacks being made on the 
police and army by the IRA. Just two weeks after Sturgis’s articulated in 
his diary that the IRA, if treated with, could be converted into bribed men 
and therefore a bit under a British thumb, the RIC continued to face a 
murderous onslaught. In the British Army’s  6th Divisional Area in 
Ireland, one that covered the counties of Cork, Kerry and Limerick there 
were plenty of examples of this: “During the early days of February 
(1921),the RIC suffered severely in ambushes, the most disastrous of 
which took place at Dromkeen in Co Limerick on February 2nd, when two 
Crossleys137 were ambushed and ten constables killed –all the wounded 
were dispatched in cold blood.” 138During this same month Cope’s 
attempts to establish contact with the leaders of the IRA continued. On 
19th February there was a raid on IRA Headquarters in South Frederick 
Street, Dublin. In epitome document no. 53/3649 on page two there is the 
following reference: “Michael Collins to C/S(Mulcahy) 19/2 /21.Cope- 
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Asking for instructions as to  treatment of high RIC officials.”139This 
reference to high RIC officials by Collins showed a knowledge of the 
official post that Cope occupied ;being in charge of transport and 
correspondence branch of the RIC. 
 
 Winter’s intelligence organisation was both locating and identifying 
Cope’s activities with respect to the IRA. It is also worthy of note that 
Cope had access to the same intelligence that was being produced by the 
organised searches. Two days after this raid, on 21st February, Sturgis 
recorded the following in his diary:” Andy on the telephone reported 
really good results from Dawson street raid. Another Shin HQ and useful 
documents seized –plans for ambushes and proof of their dissatisfaction 
with the results of those they’ve had recently in Dublin.”140  
 
At the end of March the political context was operating began to change. 
Townshend has claimed that Bonar Law’s retirement from the 
Government meant that there was now a greater flexibility in dealing with 
Sinn Fein141As Sturgis recorded: “the PM is in a much more yielding 
mood and is prepared, not only to make big fiscal concessions but to take 
the initiative and say –of course after preliminary discussion into which 
the Ulster people will be brought- what price he is willing to pay for 
peace.142” During this month British casualties continued to mount. In the 
third week there were 45 and in the last week of March there were 46. 
Despite these losses actionable intelligence was having an effect on the 
ability of the IRA to pace the insurgency. On the 24th March a major arms 
dump was uncovered in Mountjoy Square. Just over a month later on  27th 
April in some stables in Baggot Lane an IRA provincial weapons 
distribution centre was uncovered.143Then on  29th April an organised 
search on Blackhall Place captured 40 insurgents. Collin’s own offices, 
the first in Mespil Rd and the secondly at 29 Mary Street had both been 
uncovered by the end of this month. Taken together these were 
substantial blows against the insurgency.  
 
 May 1921 was one of the most important months politically. The British 
Government was committed to hold elections to the Northern and 
Southern Ireland parliaments under the Government of Ireland Act. These 
elections even saw Lloyd George be willing to consider, “ the question of 
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a truce during the elections in Ireland.”144 This idea was rejected by the 
Cabinet. Yet in the same Cabinet discussion there is an insight to the 
quality of intelligence that was now being produced by organised 
searches, and the use that Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary was 
willing to make of it: “The Sinn Fein Army –I attach its latest muster roll 
(a captured document )-is growing sullen, losing heavily and is certain to 
be defeated. A cessation now may mean its recovery....The position of the 
Crown Forces is stronger than it has ever been and is improving every 
day .The extremist leaders know this well and while they are prepared to 
fight on if there is no alternative”145.Yet he reassured the Prime Minister 
that Cope’s channels of communication remained open:” We can get in 
touch with de Valera any day, indeed we keep in touch.”146 
 
Cope was also active with respect to the Ulster Unionists. Craig had 
secretly met de Valera on 5th May. A  meeting that had been arranged by 
Cope. It achieved very little in a practical sense. It was part of a tactic to 
portray the insurgency as a war between two groups of Irishmen. Cope 
kept up pressure for another meeting. Sir James Craig rejected these  
siren calls, and cited the impending elections to establish a parliament in 
the North of Ireland. On 14th May the Chief Secretary sent the following 
communication to the Prime Minister: “Craig rightly refuses to meet De 
V again until after his election. But in the interval he has through my 
excellent Cope, who was in Belfast yesterday, submitted the attached 
suggested agenda for Dev’s consideration”. 147         
 
 Cope continued to use  Irishmen in Crown Service as a conduit for  
communications to the leaders of Sinn Fein. In a letter from Seamus 
O’Concubair to de Valera dated 18th May, evidence is provided of Cope’s 
willingness to disseminate operational intelligence with respect to the 
police. In addition, he had no compunction, despite being a civil servant , 
to openly question a key element of government policy, the Government 
of Ireland Act: “I went to see Lord Justice O’Connor on his invitation not 
knowing that Mr Cope would be present. The latter impressed me as an 
able man, very adroit and pretending a full appreciation of, and some 
sympathy with our point of view. He stated that arrangements were 
already made for the withdrawal of the Auxiliary Forces, presumably as a 
preliminary to a truce....he believed a settlement within the Empire, 
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whether as a Republic within the Empire or a Commonwealth or by 
whatever name it might be called ,would of course, have to be preceded 
by the scrapping of the present Act148.He referred contemptuously to the 
North -East Parliament as a Parliament that has smaller powers than an 
English County Council.”149       
 
 
When the elections took place on  26th May, Sinn Fein took an 
uncompromising approach: “Dail Eireann had decided to use the British 
election machinery as a cheap and convenient way of electing the Second 
Dail, which would be a larger assembly since the Government of Ireland 
Act provided for a lower house in Southern Ireland of 128 members ,as 
well as representation by 33 members in Westminster.”150 Sinn Fein were 
returned unopposed in all but the four seats, which had been allocated to 
Trinity College Dublin. As General Macready commented to Anderson, 
most those elected were ‘leading gunmen and high officials in the IRA’151 
This result did nothing to stop the insurgency or the casualties. 
Townshend has calculated that from the beginning of May to the truce on 
11th July the RIC had 114 policemen killed and the British Army had 48  
soldiers killed.152 Even Sturgis expressed his shock at the violence he was 
forced to bear witness to despite his endorsement of treating with the 
IRA. Most of all as an Englishman their lack of reciprocity shocked him : 
“Yesterday(Sunday 22nd May) was uneventful save that these brutes took 
a poor devil they had wounded on Friday out of the Mater Hospital on a 
stretcher and shot him dead in the porch. If this is the sort of ‘military 
operation’ which is logical to expect to continue in spite of negotiations 
their mentality has me beat”.153      
 
During this month  there was a progressive extension of the de facto legal 
immunity, already given to de Valera by the British Cabinet, to other 
leaders of the insurgency. Erskine Childers, the Sinn Fein Director of 
Publicity, was arrested along with Frank Gallagher on  9th May 
1921.Initially he was placed in an underground oubliette close to the 
Lower Castle Gate. He recounted in his diary an edited version of 
subsequent events and his interaction with Cope: “To my immense 
astonishment I was called for in an hour, taken to an officers’ sitting room 
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and given a cup of tea. After a long wait in another room Alfred Cope 
came and told me I was to be released ....The disgust of the officers at the 
whole business was amusing, but Cope was adamant....I left the Castle 
myself ,Cope in his effusive manner and actually carrying my valise out 
of the gate for me!”154  Foy has claimed that Cope used this opportunity 
to leak to him documents for the Sinn Fein leadership.155The 
effectiveness of Winter’s surveillance and research operation was 
underlined again when the papers that Cope had slipped to Childers in his 
valise case were captured in an organised search and circulated by Winter 
to the relevant authorities in Dublin Castle. This was one of the few 
examples of Winter applying the third variable of counter-intelligence 
and attempting to neutralise Cope. This is confirmed by epitome No 
5469.These documents were seized at 22 Mary Street in Dublin on 26th 
May: “Erskine Childers to Minister of Finance(Collins) 
16/5/21.Settlement outlined to me by Cope in the Castle a week ago was 
etc. He is probably a good actor, but his ostensible attitude was one of 
almost feverish anxiety to get something done and the business over .”156  
 
 
Despite these efforts Cope’s objective of a truce continued to be elusive. 
On the 24th May two days before the raid on Mary Street, the Irish 
Situation Committee met to examine the implications of extending 
martial law throughout the whole of Southern Ireland and considered 
what measures would have to be made for Crown Colony Government. 
Winter was by now fully aware that the government that he was working 
for was attempting to treat with the leaders of an insurgency that he was 
trying to defeat. In his autobiography he made reference to the cruellest 
of ironies. He was in receipt of intelligence that indicated the IRA was 
having difficulty in sustaining their campaign. Yet the police and the 
army were still subject to attacks. This all gave, “ little satisfaction to the 
forces who were still waging war with the rebels, for in May 1921, the 
IRA Commander in the south wrote to Collins to say that owing to the 
shortage of arms and ammunition, his men would be unable to continue 
much longer.”157 
 
The British government decided that if the devolved parliament in Dublin 
was not functioning within a fortnight of being summoned on the 28th 
June then the Viceroy would dissolve it and declare martial law 
throughout Ireland, with the exception of Northern Ireland. Cope now had 
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imposed on him a deadline of 14th July. With these pressures, Foy has 
claimed that, Cope leaked the Irish Situation Committee’s 
recommendations to the leaders of the insurgency.158To use Kent’s phrase 
a ‘meaningful pattern’ can be discerned in another epitome that the Raid 
Bureau put into circulation. It contained a message from Collins to de 
Valera dated the 16th June 1921: “Reference to interview ‘my man’ who 
is very gloomy about the situation. Recites probable progress of events 
and foreshadows measures (correctly) to be taken if Martial law is 
enforced over the whole of Ireland.”159 Although it is impossible to say 
who ‘my man’ was160 Cope’s leaking what were in effect cabinet papers 
was in one sense not surprising as he had been giving confidential and 
secret information to Sinn Fein since September 1920.161 The British 
government had progressively created a disconnect of governance. As 
Galula has argued this was the antithesis of a counter- insurgency 
strategy: “politics becomes an active instrument of operations, and so 
intricate is the interplay between them the political and the military 
actions that they cannot be widely separated; on the contrary, every 
military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and 
vice versa”.162  
 
The Army by this time was cognisant of  what Cope had been doing.Yet 
it did not detract from their determination to engage the IRA: 
“incredulous of the rumours that the Government were actually 
negotiating secretly with the leaders of the murder gang, everybody threw 
themselves with still greater energy into the struggle, and the campaign 
against the rebel Flying Columns was further intensified in June.”163           
 
If there was one event that symbolised the extent to which the British 
government had abandoned any semblance of an effective counter –
insurgency strategy, it was the arrest of de Valera on 22nd June. He was 
captured in an organised search by the Worcester Regiment, and initially 
did not give his correct name.164 The Foulkes papers provide evidence 
that when he was arrested he was found in possession of documents that 
linked him to an attack that had taken place on an army detachment seven 
days earlier: “de V is responsible for all acts of the IRA. As the head of 
the government for which it claims to act, it is true that he doesn’t 
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organise the actual atrocities but he has cognisance of them. Among his 
papers, when he was arrested last week (22/6/21) was the report, 
addressed to the President by the Minister of Defence on the train ambush 
near Dublin by the IRA against the R.W. Kent Regt (on the 16th June).”165 
Sturgis referred to the ‘seditious documents’ found in his possession 
when he was arrested.166  Robert Jeune provides further evidence, from 
one of his former colleagues in the Special Branch Dublin Military 
District, of the extent to which the Cabinet’s policy of de facto legal 
immunity for de Valera presented irreconcilable problems for the British 
intelligence community: “Now Jeffries told me that the following took 
place. Army G.H.Q.at Kilmainham wired to his London office ‘De Valera 
captured. Cope suggests release.’ This telegram arrived about 7p.m. and 
Jeffries took it across to the Colonial Office (Irish Office), but Hamar 
Greenwood had left, so Jeffries took it to Lloyd George, who rubbed his 
hands together and said ‘Well done the military. He must on no account 
be released.’ Taking this as settled, Jeffries left, but as soon as he had 
gone Lloyd George send orders for De Valera to be released, which was 
done.”167   
 
Winter, who happened to be in London at the time, requested an audience 
with the Prime Minister. When he enquired as to who ordered his release 
he was told by Lloyd George : “It was not on my orders that he was 
released.”168 Sturgis gave two further perspectives to this episode: first 
the inclination of policy makers to censor any media coverage of his 
arrest; secondly, Cope was involved in enforcing this secret policy: 
“Andy got on to the CS and  Jonathan this morning ......they said de V 
was to be released at once and the  fact that he was arrested at all was if 
possible to be kept out of the press”.169  
 
 On 23rd June, the day of de Valera’s release, the Prime Minister 
summoned his key advisers to a cabinet meeting in London the following  
day. Cope although  not initially invited , managed to gain access to the 
meeting due to the influence of Lady Greenwood. Sturgis nicknamed the 
meeting ‘the Andy Cabinet’. It was to be Cope’s first and last opportunity 
to address a full cabinet meeting. His political bias towards the insurgents 
resulted in a rebuke from his own Chief Secretary: “Andy harangued His 
Majesty’s Ministers and even on his own showing must have been pretty 
hysterical.....he talked failure without an offer and Greenwood told him 
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‘to curb his Sinn Fein tendencies.’”170The result was a personal letter 
from the Prime Minister to de Valera inviting him to meet him in 
London.171  Cope found a way to have this letter delivered on 25th June 
1921.  
 
On the same day one of the most important secret agents the British state 
had in the upper echelons of Sinn Fein filed a report to Sir  Basil 
Thompson, then Director of Intelligence in the  Home Office. Foy has 
claimed that the identity of this agent was Molly Childers, the wife of 
Erskine Childers.172 If this was the case then she would have had access 
to the leadership of Sinn Fein including both de Valera and Collins. The 
latter had even made her a trustee of the Dail Loan! At the beginning of 
this report she commented on the de Valera’s capture and subsequent 
folly of his release. But it is the judgement about his political attitudes 
that was instructive: “I have frequently told you that De Valera, what -
ever may be said to the contrary, is a red hot extremist.”173. In contrast to 
Cope, she clearly had no illusions about the bankruptcy of a policy of 
negotiation, and upon whom the true cost of this policy would fall: “I 
must again emphasize what I have repeated time after time. Any thought 
of compromise or conciliation with SF is absolutely unthinkable and 
moreover is impossible .You are not only wasting your time, you are 
frittering away the lives of valuable and gallant servants of the 
Crown.”174She also had an acute sense of the absence of the one thing 
that Cope and his colleagues assumed in the leaders of Sinn Fein: some 
sense of reciprocity: “In our attempts at conciliation they see only 
weakness and signs that they are forcing the Government to its knees, to 
grant them any damn thing they want.”175  
 
This intelligence report also gave a unique insight to three inter- related 
things: Cope’s secret contacts and negotiations with the leaders of Sinn 
Fein were being reported on ; secondly his efforts  were regarded  by the 
leaders of Sinn Fein as nugatory in their utility; finally it underlined yet 
again the real efficacy of captured documents as a source of intelligence 
on the IRA: “I told you how negotiations carried on by Cope of the Castle 
had been scoffed at and ridiculed. They say there that he was primarily 
responsible for D.V.s release, and that Boyd (GOC Dublin District) was 
all for keeping him. Is this true? The Shinners have a great wind up over 
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some documents their august President had on him at the time of his 
arrest. Was anything valuable captured?”176  
 
This intelligence report also gave an indication of her own declining 
motivation as a spy, which seemed to have crystallised around the issue 
of  de Valera’s release. She also made clear the real dangers she was 
running and the consequences for her if found out: ”you know why I took 
this job on, not for cash but to feel that I was really doing something to 
help....I wouldn’t get 10 minutes grace if  they had the slightest 
suspicion....As you know very well, this work is of the most trying 
description, no shouting or even social life for that matter, apart from the 
Society of these Shinners. The war was a pleasure to this and one felt that 
everyone was out to win.”177This intelligence report was passed to Lloyd 
George by Hamar Greenwood on 29th June. In the covering note to his 
secretary and mistress178 Greenwood characterised its importance in the 
following way : “My Dear Miss Stevenson,  
This really comes ‘straight from the Cow’179 
HG   
 
In one sense it was five days too late, as Lloyd George had already 
invited de Valera to London. However, this intelligence report left no 
illusions as to the nature of the people the Prime Minister had decided to 
negotiate with. de Valera’s response to the Prime Minister’s letter was 
given on the 29th June and published in the press. Its tone disappointed 
even Cope, and Sturgis made a reference to de Valera’s ’monkey house 
vanity’.180The day before on 28th of June, Anderson and Cope took a 
decision that was to have momentous consequences for Winter’s 
intelligence organisation and its ability to record, collate, analyse and  
assess for action information with reference to Sinn Fein. It also included 
an ability to monitor Cope’s relationship with the leaders of the 
insurgency. At a stroke it cut off a source that had provided 80%  of their 
intelligence- organised searches: “In view of the fact, following the Prime 
Minister’s letter, communications are likely to pass between leading Sinn 
Feiners which the government are bound to respect, no raids or searches 
must for the time being be made on premises occupied or frequented by 
persons of political importance without previous reference to this office 
(W. Cope or myself).Please give necessary instructions.”181  
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Two days later there was another extension of the scope of the policy of 
de facto legal immunity that had started with de Valera. The enforcement 
of law and the preservation of order had become increasingly a matter of 
political calculation. On 30th June Cope insisted that Anderson sanction 
the   release from Mountjoy prison of Griffith, MacNeill ,Duggan and 
Staines. Anderson ,though in the dark himself, agreed to the release of all 
four  convicted Republicans. On the same day Anderson wrote to his 
political boss the Chief Secretary. In this letter there was a written 
acknowledgement that Cope was acting far beyond his remit as a Crown 
civil servant: “The important thing now is to preserve the note of good 
will and reconciliation sounded in the Prime Minister’s letter. Whatever 
may be the outcome this is clearly right. There are people on this side 
who would like to trick either DV or Craig into some false move which 
would shift public opinion now standing with the Gov to the other side. 
Cope is working for himself.”182  
 
Lloyd George’s letter of 25th June led eventually to a meeting in Dublin’s 
Mansion House on  8th July. General Macready the GOC met de Valera 
and other leaders of the insurgency to agree terms of a truce. This came 
into effect at 12 noon on 11th July. It was preceded by: “one of the 
bloodiest weekends of the conflict, with the IRA killing some 20 people 
in 36 hours. The last shot was fired at a police patrol in Kingscourt ,Co 
Cavan, at 11.55am.”183 Even Sturgis admitted to his diary that ‘they killed 
right up to the Armistice.’184 
 
AFTER THE TRUCE  
There is a paradox with respect to Cope that is discernible after the truce. 
As previously stated, the ability of the intelligence community in Ireland 
to locate and identify his movements had disappeared completely.185 
However, between September 1921 and March 1924 information came 
into the public domain which confirmed the veracity of the intelligence 
that the Raiding Bureau had obtained and had circulated through the 
epitomes. The source of the information was a series of statements and 
allegations made, on both on the floor of the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords, concerning Cope’s actions prior to the truce. 
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In addition, after the truce the army emerges as a source of information 
with respect to Cope’s actions. In August 1921 General Strickland sent 
the following message to army GHQ in Dublin: “The motor car 
restrictions are a farce. Republican leaders move freely without passes in 
stolen cars, a case occurred of a DIV Commander IRA being arrested for 
this offence by the RIC. His immediate release was ordered on the 
telephone by an Under –Secretary at Dublin Castle., who ‘told off’ the DI 
concerned for arresting him ,and who chose to ignore my position as 
Military Governor of the Martial Law Area.”186   In another confidential 
memo sent by the Colonel Commandant of the 17th Infantry Brigade to 
General Strickland’s 6th Divisional Headquarters a similar pattern of 
wilfully undermining the rule of law can be discerned:” He (Cope )said 
that instructions would be sent for the car which the Essex Regiment took 
from the rebels to be handed back to the IRA. This car is the property of 
Colonel LUCAS of BALLINADEE, who is the sole and lawful owner of 
it, and it is difficult to know how its return to the rebels can be reconciled 
with any sense of justice and fair play”.187  These two examples 
illustrated the extent to which Cope continued as Anderson had expressed 
it ‘working for himself.’ 
 
Ironically it was the House of Commons that supplied an answer to the 
question that had been originally posed by Captain Robert Jeune in 
September 1920.Why was Cope one of the very few British officials who 
could walk safely about the streets of Dublin.?188The Unionist MP for  
Belfast Woodvale, Robert Lynn189 delivered the answer when he posed 
the following question to the Chief Secretary: “whether any high official 
in Dublin Castle was supplied with a safe permit or pass by the Irish 
republican army or Sinn Fein, and under what conditions it was 
issued”.190Greenwood refuted the first part of the question and then 
claimed that the second part did not arise. Lynn then responded with a 
supplementary question :”How is it that Mr Cope was able to go about 
Dublin?”191 Greenwood’s feeble riposte was to describe Cope as a 
‘plucky servant of the Crown’. There was a more serious allegation made 
by Lynn : “ whether key ciphers and confidential information regarding 
important matters in Ireland have been communicated by high officials in 
Dublin Castle to Sinn Fein Leaders; whether careful investigations have 
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revealed the fact that not more than three officials could have been 
responsible for betraying the Government secrets”192Given the fact that  
Cope was in charge of the transport and communications branch of the 
RIC, he was the prime suspect. His final question to Greenwood  revealed 
the consequences of Cope’s actions: “whether it is a fact that on several 
occasions when the police have made searches they have found the secret 
key cypher before it has been communicated to the county inspector.”193 
The Chief Secretary maintained that he had no knowledge of these facts. 
Lynn simply responded that he had.194   
 
Three years later in 1924 the Irish peer, Lord Muskerry made another set 
of  allegations against Cope. The context for this was the ongoing claims 
for compensation by ‘Irish Loyalists’ for attacks launched against their  
property by the IRA during the insurgency. The date of the attack against 
Lord Muskerry’s property was on 4th July 1921: “My place was entered 
by an armed gang of Sinn Feiners who, after removing the servants under 
arrest, proceeded to spread the contents of a barrel of petroleum over the 
furniture and floor. They then set fire to it. The place was entirely 
consumed with a valuable collection of old Family portraits and other 
paintings, old Jacobean furniture, china and other valuables.”195   
      
Having given the details of the attack, he then without using his name 
referred to Cope’s his previous career details and the fact that he had been 
appointed on the personal authority of  Lloyd George: “He selected a 
certain person in the service of the Excise Department.....This person was 
sent over to Ireland as an Assistant Under Secretary. Mr Lloyd George 
also sent over four other officials, but I am dealing especially with this 
Assistant Under Secretary.196” Lord Muskerry directly  questioned  
whether Cope had acted merely as a  Crown civil servant carrying out the 
instructions of his political masters: “On his arrival at the castle he took 
advantage of his official position to attend meetings held by heads of 
Departments to consider the best means of putting down these outrages  
and of restoring law and order. Having obtained full information, he at 
once proceeded to convey that information to the leaders of the Sinn Fein 
organisation, with the result that these plans devised by His Majesty’s 
officers came to naught and in many cases His Majesty’s officers and 
men lost their lives. The result of this treachery at headquarters was to 
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paralyse the efforts of His Majesty’s officials, and crime and outrage 
were rampant throughout the country.”197  
 
A response to Lord Muskerry’s claims was not long in coming. On 19th 
March 1924, Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent, a former Lord –Lieutenant of 
Ireland, addressed the House of Lords and proceeded to defend Cope and 
his actions. His only concession was to admit he had been a :” liaison 
officer on behalf of the Government with the Sinn Fein people.”198He 
also quoted a letter he had received from General Macready, the former 
GOC for Ireland. The General claimed :”never did I hear  the breath of 
suspicion of disloyalty. Had such been suspected it would certainly have 
come to my ears.”199 Viscount Fitzalan then challenged Lord Muskerry to 
substantiate the charges he had made on the floor of the House of Lords, 
or to repeat them outside the House and let the law take its course. 
 
Lord Muskerry’s initial response, not surprisingly was to protect his 
sources: “I had the news from friends whom I knew, and who were in a 
position to speak, and it is their statement that I made”. 200 In the two 
weeks between his initial statement in the House of Lords and this 
subsequent debate Lord Muskerry added weight to his allegations by 
citing the corroborating evidence he had recently received: “Since that 
debate I have received a number of letters from officers and ex-officers of 
the Royal Irish Constabulary who were in Dublin at the time, and they 
make the same statement. These letters are marked private and 
confidential , and I cannot make use of them.”201  
 
This Irish peer went so far as to suggest that the government set up a 
committee with the power to investigate Cope’s actions and take evidence 
as to what happened between 1919 and 1921. This proposal was rejected 
by the Lord Chancellor. Instead Cope was defended: “The Government 
are thoroughly satisfied that no case has been shown to make Sir Alfred 
Cope deserving of reproach.”202 It was also claimed that he had acted 
with the full knowledge of the Chief Secretary and the Under Secretary. 
The Lord Chancellor was supported by Lord Curzon who demanded that 
Lord Muskerry withdraw his original statement. This eventually he was 
forced to do.203    
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The concepts of counter-intelligence have been used in this article to 
identify the patterns and casual mechanisms that could both trace and 
explain Cope’s behaviour and to provide some answers to two questions. 
First, to what extent did he systematically pass confidential and secret 
information to the leaders of the insurgency?  Secondly, how far did he 
facilitate the granting of a progressive de facto legal immunity to the 
leadership of Sinn Fein? 
 
 With respect to the former question there is clear evidence to suggest that 
Cope within months of taking up his post in Ireland was passing 
confidential and secret information to Sinn Fein. There is evidence to 
suggest that members of the RIC lost their lives as a result of his actions.  
In addition, he had no compunction about undermining the rule of law in 
favour of what he interpreted as political expediency. This raises another 
question about his motivation to behave in the way that he did? Any 
answer to this question will be speculative. Not surprisingly Cope left no 
private papers. When Cope arrived in Ireland his political beliefs, self 
government for Ireland, were already formed as General Macready has 
indicated.204 More importantly this posting gave him a career opportunity 
that otherwise would have been closed to him. 
 
In terms of social class in 1920s Britain, Cope’s appointment was unusual 
in comparison to the background of his peers. When W.E. Wylie, the law 
adviser in Dublin Castle, asked Sturgis how it was that he Anderson and 
Cope had arrived together in such high positions, Sturgis responded with 
a metaphor which summarised the social differences aptly:”Anderson 
came in through the front door, Cope via the back door and himself 
through the drawing –room window”.205Sturgis described him in a 
manner that indicated a lack of familiarity with someone like Cope, ‘a 
most interesting unique creature and was at one time an Excise 
Detective.’ In one sense Cope’s background was an advantage. He was 
able to mix with the predominantly lower middle class, and working class 
leaders of Sinn Fein with an ease that Sturgis, with an Eton and Oxford 
background, would have been unable and unwilling to do. Yet his 
background resulted in him rejecting the restrictions that inevitably 
applied to senior Crown civil servants. For Sturgis this boiled over  a 
month after the Truce in August 1921.At the Royal Dublin Horseshow 
Cope avoided the Royal box where most of the senior Castle officials 
gathered. Instead he flaunted relationships that had until very recently 
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been kept secret, “he goes ‘down the drain’ not only for business but for 
pleasure, spends most of his evenings with Shinns of various sorts and 
seems to dislike all other society. They remember, if he seems to forget 
sometimes, that he is a highly placed British official with much of the 
dignity of England in his hands and I worry sometimes that his sympathy 
will encourage them to think they can get through him all they ask.206” 
 
In terms of the latter question we are presented with a paradox. The 
decision to grant de facto legal immunity to de Valera and then its 
progressive extension was not something that was in Cope’s gift. As Sir 
John Anderson had indicated, it was a cabinet level decision initially. 
Cope merely extended when he judged it appropriate. Yet as Anderson 
had remarked to Greenwood by June 1921 Cope was ‘working for 
himself.’ However, there is one dimension of his relations with the 
government of the day that remains an enigma-his relationship with 
Lloyd George. Sturgis suggests in his diary that the Prime Minister had a 
preference for a ‘bad bargain in five minutes rather than a good one in 
two hours’. In addition, the impression that Cope conveyed to leaders of 
the insurgency like Childers was one of ‘feverish anxiety to get 
something done and the business over’. As Captain Robert Jeune 
discovered his treasonable acts were protected at a highest level of 
government. 
 
 However, it has not been possible to locate evidence of direct 
communication between Cope and Lloyd George. However, it is worthy 
of note that in the same month that he finally left Ireland, October 1922, 
he was knighted and became Sir Alfred Cope. An honour conferred on 
him by Lloyd George. Ironically he never held another post in the civil 
service when he came back from Ireland. From 1923 to 1925 he occupied 
the post of secretary of the National Liberal Party. Yet the politician he 
had served from afar brought fresh problems for Cope: “he found close 
co-operation with Lloyd George impossible, and abandoned politics 
altogether.”207 There is no doubt that Cope’s secret relationship with the 
leaders of the insurgency directly led to a decision by the British 
Government to agree to a truce in July 1921.Confirmation is provided by 
Sturgis: “Lady Greenwood asked me this morning in mockery –‘Who has 
made the Truce –Smuts or the Viceroy’? ‘Neither ‘ says I ,’but one 
Cope.208” 
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One of the by products of examining Cope activities through the prism of 
counter-intelligence is that it is possible to address an important and 
related question that was raised at the beginning of this article. Can we 
now reassess the quality and the effectiveness of the new intelligence 
organisations that were established from June 1920 onwards?209 Kent 
identified two important functions that were vital to counter-intelligence: 
surveillance and research. Winter in his final report provided an insight to 
these concepts as they related to the campaign that he had just fought. 
 
 The most contentious issue with respect to surveillance and research was 
the duplication of effort between the army and the police. Winter argued 
that this was a price worth paying to maintain efficiency, and that the 
Local Intelligence Centres were in the process of resolving this issue “It 
is better to waste a certain amount of energy and time in duplication than 
to incur a loss in efficiency, and this opinion has been endorsed by the 
large majority of Police officers concerned. As has been inevitable delays 
interfered with the purposes and gradual development of the Intelligence 
organisation but, with the establishment of Local Centres, a marked 
improvement resulted, and would have continued, had not the political 
situation brought to an end.”210Winter also took a more nuanced 
approach, at the operational level, to the primacy of the RIC and their 
Special Branch than he has been given credit for211:”The psychology of 
the Crimes Special Sergeant had to be taken into consideration. He was 
an Irishman, and even to Police Officers of long service, his confidence 
was given with circumspection.”212  
 
Moreover, Winter understood that intelligence was not a panacea with 
respect to insurgency:” Intelligence alone cannot win a war. It is merely 
an aid to force, and it is only by action that the desired end can be 
attained.”213He also claimed that the British government used a degree of 
’coercion which was not sufficiently severe.’ Although he stated that they 
nearly succeeded. He identified a cardinal weakness in the policy makers 
approach and related it back to one of the leading theorists of war: “The 
great Clausewitz said ‘All kinds of philanthropy in war are a gross and 
pernicious error”214. 
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At the beginning of this article Foy made the point that many of the 
problems that intelligence officers had to deal with were caused by 
politicians 215.Hart concurred with this assertion: “intelligence efforts 
were continuously affected (and deflected) by shifts in policy, usually 
with the aim of conciliating nationalist opinion”.216 It can be suggested 
that these shifts in policy had a number of implications that affected the 
tenor of the whole campaign. 
 
 First the need to challenge, at the strategic level, the narrative of Irish 
Republicanism was never consistently addressed. This is underlined in 
the last paragraph of the British Army’s official two volume report into 
the campaign :”In one department, however, which apparently was 
independent of the Director of Intelligence, namely Publicity it was 
unrivalled .This department was energetic, subtle, and exceptionally 
skilful in mixing truth falsehood and exaggeration and was perhaps the 
most powerful and the least fought arm of the Sinn Fein Forces.”217   
 
Secondly, senior army officers such as General Strickland218 were by the 
end of the campaign deeply despondent and disillusioned at what they 
had witnessed as the disconnected approach of the government he had 
served in Ireland for over two years. The last entry in his Irish Command 
diary dated 17th May 1922 219 summed it all up: “And so this is the end of 
two and half years toil. A year ago(May 1921) we had a perfect 
organisation and had ‘them’ beat. A short time more would have 
completed it thoroughly. ’They’ knew this .and got the –Politicians to 
negotiate with the present results. Never has the country been in such a 
state .No sort of order or authority in these parts. All our labours and 
energy have been thrown in the gutter ,to say nothing of the expense and 
the deprivation. It almost makes one wish one had never been concerned 
in the show.”220 
 
  The final insight to the manner in which the campaign was affected by 
Cope’s secret activity comes ironically from Cope himself.221 It revealed 
that not just shifts in policy as Foy and Hart have claimed, but a 
systematic effort to portray the character and  outcome of the insurgency 
in a particular way that has been highly pervasive. In 1951, three years 
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before his death he was invited by the Private Secretary of the then Irish 
ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr Dulanty to participate in an oral 
history project that it had decided to set up.  This programme was called 
the Bureau of Military History.222 It had been established in January 1947 
by the then Irish Minister of Defence, Oscar Traynor.223  
 
Cope, perhaps not surprisingly, refused to participate in the project. Yet 
in giving his reasons we get a sense of both justification and remorse 
about the events he helped shape: “Over the years I have had offers from 
various sources for my views and experiences but have turned then all 
down because I regard the period (and also that following the Treaty) to 
be the most discreditable of your country’s history-it is preferable to 
forget it :to let sleeping dogs lie.”224 Secondly, he provided a unique 
critique of the narrative that he himself had done so much to construct: 
“The I.R.A. must be shown as national heroes and the British Forces as 
brutal oppressors. Accordingly, The Truce and the Treaty will have been 
brought about by the valour of small and ill- equipped groups of 
irregulars. And so on. What a travesty it will be and must be.”225  Cope’s 
letter also acknowledged the self sustaining destructiveness of what 
would become the accepted Irish Republican narrative : “Read by future 
generations of Irish children, it will simply perpetuate the long standing 
hatred of England and continue the work of self-seeking politicians.”226 . 
Events in Ireland between 1919 and 1922 are still set within this 
judgement that still dominates today: “The dominant narrative remains 
that of the nationalist movement in conflict with British rule.”227 In 
addition, there is the belief that the British side failed to provide and 
sustain coherence: “It might be argued that the IRA campaign succeeded 
largely through the lack of political direction on the British side.”228The 
accepted judgement about the effectiveness of British intelligence, both 
its organisation and its end product, needs to be understood in the context 
of Cope’s activities that hampered both. 
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There is also the issue of understanding this campaign in the wider 
context of why an insurgency is something that no state can ignore, let 
alone treat with, and identifying the key problem that the state has to 
successfully address. It is also important to consider British attitudes to  
counter-insurgency. Beatrice Heuser identified the nature of the threat 
posed, “Insurgents threaten the very power structure of society.”229 She 
has also identified the key challenge in countering any insurgency, ”The 
most immediate and pressing problem of counterinsurgency has always 
been how to find and capture the insurgents.”230 The willingness to grant 
de fact legal immunity to de Valera, and a reluctance to action 
intelligence that Winter had obtained about Collins whereabouts 
underlined the disconnected nature of the British approach. 
 
   Colin Gray has argued that strategic culture is not only ‘out here’, but 
‘within us’ .Individuals, institutions, and collective behaviour form an 
important context. It weaves together through people and institutions and 
encompasses ideas and norms. The British political class has displayed a 
perverse approach to insurgency: “Secret negotiations, it must be 
remembered, are a constant trend throughout British counter-insurgency 
campaigns”.231 Cope certainly exemplified this proclivity in Ireland 
between 1920 and 1921.This preference it can be argued is part of a wider 
cultural context that goes beyond the narrow confines of unconventional 
war. Basil Liddell Hart has claimed that there is a hidden British cultural 
assumption with respect to war: “A romantic habit has led us to hide, and 
has even hidden from us, our essentially business like traditions in the 
conduct of war.”232 This goes some way to explain why the cause 
indentified by the Royal Commission in the run up to the 1916 Irish 
rebellion: the cardinal rule of Government demands that enforcement of 
law and preservation of order should always be independent of political 
expediency continued with no change between 1919 to 1921. Alexander 
would argue that it represented the existence of what he termed  an 
‘operating code’. It expresses a political leader’s and policy makers 
beliefs about the nature of politics and conflict. Collectively they act as 
a:”prism that influences the actors perceptions and diagnoses of the flow 
of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular 
situations.”233 
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Finally in a normative sense the relationship between an intelligence 
community and  a state is an important one. Smith has argued: “If we see 
intelligence and security as a part of the core executive machinery then 
we can analyse intelligence in terms of its role in the political relationship 
with central government .”234 The relationship that the intelligence 
community in Ireland had with both the administration in Dublin Castle 
and Lloyd George in London was a  disconnected one. Despite this in a 
very short period of time British intelligence succeeded in two respects: 
at a tactical level it identified the insurgents and produced actionable 
intelligence. This in turn challenged the ability of the IRA to pace the 
conflict. At the operational level intelligence enabled the  security forces 
to penetrate, divert and subvert the IRA’s organisational networks. In any 
counterinsurgency intelligence is in the forefront of both police and 
military operations. Often the border between them can be hard to 
discern. In Ireland between 1919 and 1921 Cope’s activities undermined 
the legal authority of the British state and the competent execution of 
rational rules. Yet the concepts of counter-intelligence have helped us 
understand why and how he was able to act in the ways that he did.      
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